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Miller: Constitutional Criminal Procedure - The Standards for the Sixth A

CASE NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-The Standards for the Sixth
Amendment Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel. Adger v. State of
Wyoming, 584 P.2d 1056 (Wyo. 1978).

On May 26, 1976, Mabel Adger was returning to Casper
in a car with several men, one of whom, Boggess, she was living with.' A dispute arose between Mabel and Boggess, and
when Mabel stopped the car, Boggess jumped out and ran.'
Mabel, armed with a gun, pursued him around a nearby
house. 3 When Mabel was two to three feet from Boggess she
fired several shots.4 Although she did not harm him, Mabel
was arrested at the scene.
The legal events preceding Mabel Adger's conviction for
assault with a deadly weapon led to a successful appeal of
her conviction on the ground that her right to counsel had
been violated. In reviewing the case, the Wyoming Supreme
Court examined the following scenario.
Mabel was brought before the justice of the peace on
May 27, 1976.6 She was advised of her right to retain counsel
or have counsel appointed for her if she were unable to retain
one. Mabel informed the Justice that she had an attorney in
Casper, but that she would like to have one appointed to consult with at that time.8 The court declined to appoint an attorney at that point, and asked Mabel to inform him as soon
as she had retained counsel.9 Mabel agreed to appear at her
preliminary hearing with her attorney, and stated that if she
had problems in retaining counsel she would ask the court to
appoint one.10

At her preliminary hearing on June 23, 1976, Mabel was
represented by an attorney." The attorney qualified his appearance as a "special" one12on behalf of the Casper attorney
whom Mabel had retained.
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Mabel was arraigned before the district court on July
29, 1976, and appeared without her attorney.13 She informed
the court that she had retained and paid a fee to her lawyer
who was unable to attend. 4 Her attorney had advised her to
have the court appoint an attorney for the arraignment, but
when the court offered to do so, she declined the appointment stating she wanted to retain her own lawyer and agreed
to waive the assistance of counsel at the arraignment.'
The court set the trial date for August 30 with all motions to be filed by August 13.16 The judge strongly advised
Mabel to obtain an attorney as soon as possible so there
would be time for adequate preparation of her defense. He
again insisted she notify the court if she were not successful
in retaining counsel so the court could appoint an attorney. 7
He warned her that the consequences could be severe if she
failed to comply. 8
On August 12 Mabel called the judge and informed his
clerk that an attorney would represent her at trial. 9 Four
days later, her attorney called the judge and told him he
would not be representing Mabel unless she paid the fee.20
When the judge inquired about the attorney's intent he replied that he expected to be paid and that he was not out of
the case.2' After the discussion with Mabel's attorney the

judge called the public defender's office to notify them of the
situation, although he did not assign the case to them.22
The attorney, on August 18 or 19, advised the judge
that arrangements had been made with another party to pay
the retainer and that the attorney was satisfied with the
plan, but he refused to confirm his appearance as her counsel.23
On August 25, only five days before trial, the judge
called the attorney to inquire as to the attorney's status in
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id
Id
Brief for Appellant, supra note 1, at 7.
Id
Adger v. State, supra note 6.
Id
Id
Adger v. State, supra note 6, at 1057, 1058.
Id
Id
Brief for Appellant, supra note 1.at 8.
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the case.24 The attorney indicated there was still a problem
with the fees, and would not commit himself. 21 The court
then instructed the sheriff's office to find Mabel Adger and
insist she meet with her attorney to resolve the problem. 2
That evening the attorney called the judge and indicated he
felt the fee would be paid but again he would not declare himself formally as counsel.27 At this time the judge told the attorney that it appeared to him he was not being fair with the
defendant.28
That same evening the attorney called the public defender's office and indicated he probably would not be handling
the Adger defense.2 9 He told them he would have Mabel con-

tact them so they could consult with her, and he gave them a
brief summary of the case.3
Finally on August 26, two members of the public defender's staff were assigned to prepare Mabel Adger's defense." Mabel Adger's new counsel filed a motion for a continuance on August 27, stating that three days, two of which
were on a weekend were insufficient for adequate trial
preparation.12 The trial judge denied the motion in chambers,
but did offer the court's assistance in locating witnesses over
the weekend, and ordered the prosecution to disclose all information available.3
Monday morning, August 30, the defense counsel renewed its motion for a continuance, again stating they did
not have adequate time to prepare themselves to protect
Mabel Adger's interests, to properly present any defenses
she might have and to adequately cross-examine the State's
witnesses. 4 Though the defense counsel did not present factual information showing how more time would improve the
defense, they did discuss specific areas where the preparation was insufficient. 5 Also, they indicated they had to take
24.
25.
26.

Adger v. State, supra note 6, at 1058.
Id
Id

27.

Id.

28.

Brief for Appellant, supra note 1, at 9.
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30.
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Adger v. State, supra note 6, at 1058.
Id
Brief for Appelant, supra note 1, at 10, 11.
Adger v. State, supra note 6, at 1058.
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care of other matters on Thursday and Friday before they
could begin research on the case. 6
The trial court again denied the motion for a continuance.37 While the judge was sympathetic to the public
defender's desire to properly defend, he indicated that the
court had given Mabel Adger every reasonable opportunity
to prepare for the defense, and any inadequacies were the
result of her actions. 8 Following a brief trial, Mabel was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon.
On appeal, Adger contended that the trial court's
refusal to grant her pretrial motions for a continuance resulted in a deprivation of her right to effective assistance of
counsel as guaranteed by the state and federal constitutions.
The Wyoming Supreme Court reversed and remanded the
case for a new trial. The court held that the trial court had erred in allowing the defendant's retained counsel to withdraw
from the case, but since the withdrawal had been made, the
continuance should have been granted.39
BACKGROUND OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

The Right Applied to the States
The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution
provides, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the assistance of counsel for his
defense.' 04 The notion of effective right to counsel was conceived by the United States Supreme Court in the 1932 decision Powell v. Alabama, which involved a capital case." In
Powell"2 the Court held that mere assignment of counsel does
not meet the mandate of the constitution. The assignment of
counsel must also provide effective aid in the preparation of
the case for trial. 3
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Brief for Appellant, supra note 1, at 11.
Adger v. State, supra note 6, at 1058.
Brief for Appellant, supra note 1, at 10, 11.
Adger v. State, supra note 6, at 1062.
U.S. Const. amend. VI.
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
Id
l& at 71.
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The Powell holding pioneered the decisions providing for
effective assistance of counsel in capital cases. Shortly after
Powell, the Court extended the right to non-capital federal
cases in Johnson v. Zerbst." But for thirty-one years the
Court refused to apply the sixth amendment to the States in
non-capital cases.' 6 Underlying much of their recalcitrant

position was a fear that extension of the right to effective
counsel in all state criminal prosecutions could lead to an extension of the right in civil cases.' 6
The break through came in 1963 with the Supreme
Court decision of Gideon v. Wainright."7 The Court indicated
that Powell v. Alabama"8 should be controlling with its instruction that the right to effective counsel is fundamental
in character.4 9 Analogizing the sixth amendment right to effective counsel with other constitutional rights, the Court
declared that the fourteenth amendment made the sixth
amendment obligatory upon the states, as it had other fundamental rights. 0
The Gideon decision extended the right to effective
assistance of counsel to state felony prosecutions. Nine
years later the Supreme Court again broadened the protection by declaring the right to effective assistance of counsel
exists in any criminal proceeding felony or misdemeanor,
where there existed the possibility of confinement as punishment."
The Standards for Effective Assistance of Counsel
Since the Supreme Court's holding in Powel4 the
elements of effective assistance of counsel have been a kaleidoscopic area of the law. Though the Supreme Court has intimated there exists a broad general test, they have left the
task of delineating the standards for effective assistance of
counsel to the lower federal and state courts."
44.

Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

E.g., Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
HERMAN, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN MISDEAMEANOR COURT, 6 (1973).

Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
Powell v. Alabama, supra note 41.
Gideon v. Wainwright, supra note 47.
Id
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
Annot., 26 A.L.R. Fed. 218, 222 (1976).
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The federal courts originally employed a sham, farce or
mockery test under which there was no denial of effective
assistance of counsel unless tactical mistakes, errors in judgment, inexperience, lack of skill or lack of preparation were
so apparent or inadequate that the trial was reduced to a
sham, farce or mockery of justice." In 1945 the District of
Columbia Circuit applied this test in Diggs v. Welch, and set
54
the trend for other circuits to folow.
Not until 1960, in Mackenna v. Ellis, did a higher standard for effective assistance of counsel appear." The test formulated in Mackenna required that effective assistance of
counsel amount to "counsel reasonably likely to render and
56
rendering reasonably effective service.
Needless to say the "reasonably effective assistance"
test left many questions unanswered, mainly, what was customary or reasonable conduct for an attorney during the
various stages before, during and after a trial.5 7 The fourth
circuit enunciated the first major guidelines in applying the
"reasonably effective assistance" standard. In Coles v.
Peyton 8 the Court set out five requirements that needed to
be met to assure that effective assistance of counsel was provided. First, counsel should be appointed promptly and be
afforded reasonable opportunity to prepare. Thirdly, counsel
should confer with his client without delay and conduct sufficient investigations. Finally, he should be allowed time for
reflection and preparation. 9 Failure to meet these requirements was prima facie evidence of a denial of effective representation."0 The burden of proof then fell on the state to
show lack of prejudice. 1
Again the District of Columbia Circuit established a new
trend when Judge Bazelon,6 2 wrote the opinion in United
6
States v. De Coster.
,' The Court held that a defendant is en53. WHARTON'S CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 3, § 416 (12th ed. 1976).
54. Diggs v. Welch, 80 U.S. App. D.C. 5, 148 F.2d 667 (1945).
55. Mackenna v. Ellis, 280 F.2d 592 (5th Cir. 1960).
56. Id at 599.
57. Bazelon, The Realities of Gideon and Argersinger, 64 GEo. L. J. 811, 819-24 (1976).
58. Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224 (4th cir. 1968).
59. Id
60. Id
61. Id at 230.
62. Chief Judge Daniel L. Bazelon has been a major proponent for establishing workable
standards for the effective assistance of counsel.
63. United States v. DeCoster, 159 App. D.C. 326, 487 F.2d 1197 (1973).
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titled to the reasonably competent assistance of an attorney
acting as his diligent, conscientious advocate.64 The
distinguishing feature of this case was the general and
specific guidelines the court delineated for meeting the standard. Generally, the court required that counsel follow the
American Bar Association Standards for the Defense Function, 5 and more specifically counsel should: 1. confer with
his client without delay and as often as necessary to plan his
defense, 2. advise his client of his rights and take all actions
necessary to preserve them, and 3. 6conduct appropriate in6
vestigations both legal and factual.

All of the federal circuits have adopted standards or
tests for the effective assistance of counsel. Only the second
and tenth circuits have clearly held on to the "sham, farce, or
mockery of justice" test.6 7 Though the first circuit had

previously adopted the "sham, farce or mockery" test, many
of its decisions include discussions of reasonably effective
assistance of counsel as part of a higher standard that may
be applied.6"
Both the eighth and ninth circuits, while adopting the
"sham, farce, mockery" test, indicate that the effect of the
test will not be the traditional low standard. In McQueen v.
Swenson the eighth circuit clarified its use of the "sham,
farce, mockery" test, saying that the words were not intended to be a "shibboleth" to avoid analysis of the case, but instead the words were to indicate that a defendant claiming
ineffective assistance of counsel had a heavy burden to prove
unfairness. 6 9 The ninth circuit, in a number of cases that had
purportedly applied the "sham, farce, mockery" test, indicated that the defendant need only show that counsel was
not reasonably likely to render and did not render reasonably
effective assistance to establish want of effective assistance.70
64.
65.

U.S. v. DeCoster, supra note 64, at 1202.
See, ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL

JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO
THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION PP. 153-170.

66. U.S. v. DeCoster, supra note 64, at 1203, 1204.
67. Annot., 26 A.L.R. Fed. 218, 241, 254 (1976).
68. Annot., 26 A.L.R. Fed. 218, 239 (1976).
69. McQueen v. Swenson, 498 F.2d 207, 214 (8th Cir. 1974).
70. See, e.g., Cooper v. Fitzharris, 551 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1977).
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The remaining circuits, including the fourth as evidenced by Coles v. Peyton,71 have either impliedly or explicitly rejected the "sham, farce, mockery" test and have
established higher standards. In applying a standard of cus
tomary skills and knowledge prevailing at the time and place
when the question of effective assistance arises, the third circuit stated that the court should look to the sufficiency of
preparation and knowledge of relevant law exhibited by the
defense counsel. 72 They also held that this standard of norapplied to the states as well as the federal
mal competancy
3
courts.

7

The fifth circuit has continued to support the "reasonably effective assistance" standard which they set forth in
4
But guidelines have been given such as
MacKenna v. Ellis.7
requiring that an attorney be acquainted with the law and
the facts of a case.7 Recently in Gandy v. Alabama76 the fifth
circuit determined that the right to effective assistance of
counsel includes four variations; (1) the right to have
counsel, (2) the right to minimum quality of counsel, (3) the
right to a reasonable opportunity to select and be represented by chosen counsel, (4) and the right to a preparation
period sufficient to assure a minimum quality of defense."
In abandoning the "sham, farce, mockery" test the
sixth circuit, in Beasley v. United States, declared that the
right to effective assistance of counsel was too fundamental
and absolute to allow courts to attempt to calculate the
amount of prejudice that resulted from a denial of the right.78
Thus the court refused to allow the harmless error rule to be
applied when questions of effective assistance of counsel
arose. 79 The Beasley decision also stated that defense
counsel must perform at least as well as a lawyer with ordinary skill and training in Criminal Law in protecting his
client's interest. 80
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Coles v. Peyton, supra note 59.
Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730, 737 (3rd Cir. 1970).
IdL
Mackenna v. Ellis, supra note 56.
See, Caraway v. Beto, 421 F.2d 636 (5th Cir. 1970).
Gandy v. Alabama, 569 F.2d 1318 (5th Cir. 1978).
Gandy v. Alabama, supra note 77 at 1323.
Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687 (6th Cir. 1974).
Id at 696.
Id.
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In Williams v. Twomey the seventh circuit held that
mere inexperience of counsel alone would not be sufficient to
establish lack of effective assistance of counsel.' The court
should look to how well counsel performed, not to counsel's
experience.82 The new rule established by the seventh circuit
required that defense counsel representation meet a minimum standard of professional representation.83
While the United States Supreme Court has not actively
expressed its views on the standards for effective assistance
of counsel, the justices have alluded to what they perceive
the standards to be. In McMann v. Richardson the court indicated that effective counsel did not turn on whether counsel's advice was right or wrong, but on whether that advice
was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys
in criminal cases. 84 Three years later the McMann" standard
was reiterated in part in Tollett v. Henderson. 6 Justice

Rehnquest's majority opinion held that a defendant was entitled to relief if his counsel's advise was not within the range
of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. 7
But the Court has also avoided many opportunities to review
questions of ineffective assistance of counsel by denying certiorari88 or skirting the issue.8 9
The state courts, on the other hand, have looked to the
federal courts for guidance and have adopted and modified
many of the circuit court tests. An analysis of the state court
decisions applying these tests is in the Analysis of the Adger
case.
THE COURT'S REASONING IN

ADGER

The Wyoming Supreme Court considered two issues in
deciding whether the defendant had been denied her right to
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

89.

Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634, 638 (7th Cir. 1975).
Id at 639.
Id.
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
Id
Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973).
Id.
Brescia v. New Jersey, cert. denied 94 S. Ct. 2630 (1974). Justice's Marshall and
Brennan in a brief dssent to the denial of certiorari cited U.S. v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300
(1973) as requiring timely appointment of counsel and adequate preparation as absolute pre-requisites affording defendant's constitutional protection. The case in
question in Brescia involved a defendant who had to go to trial with an unprepared
public defender appointed at the last minute.
Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978). Though the case dealt with the right to
effective counsel and the problems with representing conflicting interests the Court
evaded commenting on the effectiveness standards.
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effective assistance of counsel. First they considered the
trial court's discretionary function in granting a continuance. Secondly they addressed the issue of an attorney's
withdrawal from a case.
In determining that the trial court had erred in denying
a continuance to Mabel Adger, the court had to reconcile its
position ° with the earlier holding in Ash v. State of Wyoming. 1 In Ash, the defendant was charged with two counts
of burglary.2 At his arraingment on January 6, 1975 Ash
was advised of his right to an attorney, for the arraignment. 3 He told the court he wanted to proceed without an attorney and he entered a plea of not guilty. 4 The court informed Ash that the state would provide an attorney if he
were unable to obtain one, then the court inquired if he would
have an attorney at trial. 5 Ash replied that he would, unless
he could not afford one. 6 The judge asked if there were any
reason why he could not afford to retain an attorney.97 Ash
stated that he had no cash, but that he had given some money to an attorney in Casper who had given him preliminary
advice. 8 The attorney wanted a chance to look over the case
before he accepted it. 99 Again the judge explained that an attorney would be provided for Ash at public expense if he
could not afford one. 100 Ash advised the court that he did not
feel he was a needy person.' At that point the judge asked
Ash if he waived all claim to an attorney provided at public
expense, and Ash responded that he did.0 2 Ash was then required to post an additional five hundred dollars for a bond,
part of which would be released to pay an attorney.103
A few weeks later Ash filed a motion for a change of
judge which was granted." 4 On February 10 the newly assigned judge reset the trial date from February 11 to Feb90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96,
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Adger v. State, supra note 6, at 1059.
Ash v. State, 555 P.2d 221 (1976).
Ash v. State, supra note 92, at 222.
I&
Id.
I&
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
1d
Ash v. State, supra note 92, at 223.
Id.
Id
Id
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ruary 12106 and asked a member of the public defender's ofconsult with Ash and see if he had retained counfice to
6
sel.

10

The day before trial a public defender met with Ash to
explain the trial procedure.10

7

Ash indicated he could not

handle it himself, and the public defender advised him to get
an attorney.108 Ash then asked the public defender to represent him. 09
The following day at trial, the court appointed the public
defender to represent Ash.2 0 The public defender had represented another defendant involved in the same incident and
was familiar with the facts."' At the outset of the trial Ash's
counsel made a motion for a continuance so that he could be
more fully prepared on the issues." 2 The court denied the motion.1 ' Ash appeared, stating it was error for the trial court
to deny his motion for a continuance." 4
In affirming the lower court's decision, the Wyoming
Supreme Court stated that Ash, by his actions, waived his
rights to the appointment of counsel until the morning of the
trial."' The Court looked at many factors in making their determination. First, Ash was given an opportunity to request
counsel which he waived." 6 If the judge had not been con-

cerned about the situation, Ash would have gone to trial
without counsel due to his own fault in not seeking appointed counsel."

7

The court found that Ash's own carelessness

and lack of diligence created the situation." 8
Also the court indicated that the time spent with a client
is not the sole factor in determining competent assistance. 119
If the attorney is familiar with the facts and the problem, as
Ash's counsel was, then a late appointment would be less
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id
Id
id
Id
Ash v. State, supra note 92, at 224.
Id
Id.
Ash v. State, supra note 92, at 226.
Ash v. State, supra note 92, at 224.
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likely to cause harm. 2 ' The court stated that the Ash record
revealed it was "a well tried and sharply contested" case.1
Thus the trial had not been reduced to a sham, farce or
mockery of justice, and Ash had not been deprived of effective assistance of counsel.
This lengthy description of the Ash facts is necessary to
understand the court's reasoning in Adger. The major factor
distinguishing Adger from Ash was the finding that Ash, by
his own actions had waived his right to appointed counsel
until the morning of the trial, while Adger had relied on retained counsel who withdrew, leaving her no choice but to ac122
cept appointed counsel right before trial.
In Adger the court focuses on the problem created by
Mabel Adger's retained counsel withdrawing so close to
trial. 2 ' By accepting the fifty dollars for services and the
continued representations that when Mabel made further
payment he would be in the case, the attorney in effect made
a formal appearance. 12 4 In doing so, the attorney owed a duty
both to his client and to the court to give reasonable justification and notice for his withdrawal, so that his client would
have adequate time to seek other counsel. 125 His failure to
give this timely notice resulted in the hurried appointment of
a public defender a few days before Mabel Adger's trial.
Adger should not be held responsible for the problems created by her attorney.
The court also addressed the problem of late appointment of counsel. In her appeal Adger did not claim that her
appointed counsel lacked legal competence.' 2 Her sole claim
was based on the fact that her counsel had insufficient time
to prepare an adequate defense.'2 7 The court recognized that
the right to effective assistance of counsel includes reasonable and adequate time for counsel to prepare, they followed
the approach of the United States Supreme Court. 8 This approach is not based on any per se rules as to what is timely
120. Ash v. State, supra note 92, at 224, 225.
121. Ash v. State, supra note 92, at 226.
122. Adger v. State, supra note 6, at 1059.
123. 1I
124. Adger v. State, supra note 6, at 1060.
125. Id at 1059.
126. Adger v. State, supra note 6, at 1061.
127. Id.
128. Adger v. State, supra note 6, at 1058.
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appointment of counsel.12 9 Instead this approach requires
that the court make each decision on a case by case basis in
light of the circumstances presented and the harm if any
that occurred."'
By considering the circumstances in Adger the court
found that the tardy appointment of counsel had worked to
deny Adger her right to effective assistance of counsel.'
Since the problem was created by the retained counsel withdrawing and was not the fault of Adger, the court held that
there was error in not granting the continuance.'
ANALYSIS

As mentioned, the constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel is guaranteed to all defendants in federal or
state criminal prosecutions whenever the possibility of imprisonment exists. The standards for measuring what is effective assistance of counsel are varied as evidenced by the
rulings in the federal circuit courts.
Many state courts have adopted standards to help define effective assistance of counsel. Wyoming addressed the
effective assistance issue in Galbraith v. State of Wyoming.3 Though not specifically adopting the "sham, farce,
mockery of justice" test, the court approved that standard
for evaluating a defendant's claim that his counsel was unconstitutionally ineffective."'
The court referred to the "sham, farce, mockery" test
again in Ash. 3" The reference was not made in conjunction
with the question of whether the tardy appointment of counsel and denial of the continuance constituted a violation of
the right of effective counsel. Rather, the test was applied to
the performance of the public defender at trial, where it was
found that effective representation under the test had been
36
provided.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id.
Id.
Adger v. State, supra note 7, at 1062.
Id.
Galbraith v. State of Wyoming, 503 P.2d 1192 (Wyo. 1972).
Id.
Ash v. State, supra note 92.
Id-
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In Adger the court again considered the effective assistance of counsel issue, but this time it turned its attention to
whether tardy appointment of counsel denied a defendant's
right to effective assistance of counsel.
Although the court found that the tardy appointment of
counsel in Adger did deny Mabel her right to effective counsel, the decision made no reference to the standard for effective assistance of counsel other than to indicate the right included reasonable and adequate time to prepare. Instead the
court followed the case by case method accepted by the United States Supreme Court."3 7 The court went on to say that
tardy appointment of counsel would not be per se a denial of
effective assistance of counsel.1"8 The court looked at the
question of fault, indicating by their decisions in Ash and
Adger that if the defendant were the cause of the late appointment of counsel, as in Ash, then the tardy appointment
was not a denial of effective assistance of counsel. But if, as
in Adger, the late appointment was due through no fault of
the defendant, then the late appointment could result in a
denial of effective assistance of counsel.
When faced with a similar situation, the Florida court, in
Kimbrough v. State, also ruled that the trial court erred in
denying the continuance. 3 9 The defendant's public defender
resigned at the defendant's arraignment. At trial, the public
defender who represented the defendant had not had time to
prepare the case and moved for a continuance, which was denied. 4" In finding the denial of the continuance error, the
court examined the American Bar Association Standards relating to the Defense Function. 4 ' Section 4.1 of the defense
standards provides that counsel has the duty to promptly investigate all facts of the case. 42 The court found that defendant's counsel had not had an opportunity to fulfill his duty
to investigate, resulting in the defendant's loss of effective
assistance of counsel.
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Wisconsin has also used the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice in providing guidelines to determine effective assistance of counsel. " Violation of the guidelines is not automatically ruled as incompetent or ineffective counsel, but
the Wisconsin court felt that the "sham, farce, mockery"
test was too lenient, and that more stringent standards were
needed to guide the courts and bar.145 In a concurring opinion
one justice indicated that the Rules of the Court might provide a more efficient means for expressing the standards for
effective assistance and timely appointment of counsel. 14
Texas chose to adopt such a rule stating that appointed
counsel is entitled to ten days to prepare for trial which may
be waived by written notice.'47
In rejecting the "sham, farce, mockery" test both Idaho'4 8 and Kansas' 4 turned to the standards set forth in Unit-

ed States v. DeCoster.50 Alaska also chose to reject the
"sham, farce, mockery" test and adopted a test created by
Professor J. Finer' which requires effective counsel to exhibit the normal, customary skill possessed by an attorney
fairly skilled and experienced in criminal law."' While this
case did not address the problem of tardy appointment of
counsel, the court indicated that the original sham, farce,
mockery standard was so vague that it placed too heavy a
burden on the defendant.
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Other courts have also found that the sham, farce,
mockery test places too heavy a burden on the defendant to
prove that the trial has been reduced to a mockery. The Coles
v. Peyton test provides strong protection for the defendant
since it shifts the burden of proof to the prosecution to show
lack of prejudice when an effective counsel claim is established. 1 14 In DeCoster the court stated that if the defendant
could show a substantial violation of any of the A.B.A. standards on the specific requirements the court laid out, then it
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was presumed he had been denied effective representation
unless the prosecution could prove the defendant had not
been prejudiced. 55 As mentioned, the sixth circuit has refused to allow the harmless error rule to be applied when
questions of effective assistance of counsel arise, thus giving
great weight to a finding of ineffective assistance of coun16

sel.

It is not clear that the Wyoming Supreme Court has
ever adopted the sham, farce, mockery test. While they alluded to the test in Galbraith and Ash, the court also referred to the Ash case as being "well tried and sharply contested"'' 7 intimating that the court was actually applying a
higher standard than the sham, farce, mockery test. Further
support for this can be found in Adger where the court determines that the case was not well tried and sharply contested. 58
The decisions in Ash and Adger leave many questions
about Wyoming's effective assistance of counsel standards
unanswered. Though it appears the court would apply a
stronger test than the sham, farce, mockery test, the factors
for a "well tried and sharply contested" trial are not clearly
defined.
Also, the court fails to fully explain where the burden of
proof for establishing denial of effective assistance of counsel falls. In their concurring opinion Justices Rose and McClintock argue for a presumption of ineffective assistance of
counsel whenever there has been a tardy appointment of
counsel, placing the burden of proof on the prosecution to
prove that the late appointment was harmless.15 9 Since the
courts inquired into whose fault brought about the tardy appointment of counsel, an assumption can be made that the
defendant has the burden of proving that he was not at fault.
Although the court has not fully addressed the issue of
standards for effective assistance of counsel, the Adger case
does provide guidance on the tardy appointment of counsel
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question. The court indicates that if, through no fault of the
defendant's, there has been a late appointment of counsel,
the defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel has
been denied if he can show that inadequate preparation time
has prejudiced his case.
GUIDANCE FOR THE FUTURE

One argument that courts have advanced when deciding
not to approve a higher standard for effective assistance of
counsel is that the expedition of the trial process will be
hampered by claims of ineffective counsel. 160 This view was
expressed by the Wyoming court in Ash.' 61 The Constitu-

tional right to effective assistance of counsel far outweighs
any administrative concerns the court might have.16 ' A defendant can not adequately exercise any of his other fundamental rights unless he is guided by effective counsel.
There are several strategies that could be utilized at the
pretrial level to help avoid any backlogging of the courts due
to ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Trial judges could
require counsel to demonstrate adequate case preparation
through submittal of worksheets reporting the steps covered.'13 Public defender offices could set internal standards
for appointment of counsel, caseload limits and preparation.1 64 Where penal implications are not as severe, grievance65
procedures could be established for nonfelony defendants.'
Finally, the bar could act as a monitor of the effectiveness of
166
the defense system.

Implementation of selected pretrial strategies and the
use of the higher standard alluded to in the Adger case would
help assure that meritorious claims of ineffective assistance
of counsel did not create a backlog in the courts.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Farrell v. United States, 391 A.2d 755 (D.C. 1978).
Ash v. State, supra note 92, at 224.
Farrell v. U.S., supra note 161.
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE RIGHT TO
COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES: THE MANDATE OF Argersinger v. Hamlin, EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY 12 11976).

164.
165.
166.
167.

Id
Id. at 13.
Id
Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CRIM. L. REV. 1 (1973).

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1979

17

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 14 [1979], Iss. 2, Art. 8

568

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XIV

CONCLUSION

The "sham, farce, mockery of justice" test sets such a
low standard that it has been called a mockery of the sixth
amendment right to effective counsel.1 67 Ineffective assistance of counsel need not imply that counsel was inadequate.
It only indicates that the defendant did not get the effective
assistance he was entitled to, whatever the reason.
The Wyoming Supreme Court has taken a step forward
in accepting a higher standard for the effective assistance of
counsel by its holding in Adger that tardy appointment of
counsel can work to deny a defendant effective assistance of
counsel. In future cases the court may have to confront the
issue of incompetent counsel and other effective assistance
problems. Their apparent adoption of a higher standard than
the sham, farce, mockery test should be used to guide decisions in these areas.
The right to effective assistance of counsel is the most
fundamental of all rights since without effective counsel,
most defendants would be incapable of asserting other

1 68
rights they might have.
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